Sex Differences in Tenure Profiles: Effects of Shared Firm-Specific Investment
利用模型分析性别、年龄和企业类型对任期的影响，发现固定工资合同虽能防止机会主义，但会导致低效离职，而最优投资分担率随特征变化，实证结果支持理论预测。
This article employs a model of Masanori Hashimoto with extensions by Donald Parsons to analyze variation in tenure by sex, age, and firm type. Fixed-wage contracts eliminate postcontractual opportunism associated with firm-specific human capital investment. However, such contracts result in inefficient quits and terminations. Calibration of the sharing of this investment between workers and employers minimizes the costs of these inefficient separations. Moreover, this optimal sharing rate varies systematically with the characteristics listed above. These tenure-slope implications are tested with favorable results. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.