Contracting Benefits of Corporate Giving: An Experimental Investigation
通过实验室实验，研究企业慈善捐赠对员工努力和贡献的影响，发现利他效应和信号效应，表明企业捐赠能有效激励员工，减少对正式奖励系统的依赖。
ABSTRACT We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether corporate giving to charity motivates employees. We find a strong altruism effect. Even when employees cannot be remunerated for their actions, employee contributions to employers significantly increase as the level of corporate giving increases. We also find a signaling effect. When employees can be remunerated for their actions, employee contributions initially increase as the level of corporate giving increases. Thus, even though corporate giving to charity decreases the amount that can be shared between employees and employers, employees behave as if more charitable employers will return proportionally more to employees. It is not until relatively high levels of corporate giving that employee contributions to employers eventually decrease. Collectively, our results suggest that corporate giving is an effective lever for motivating employee effort and contributions to organizational endeavors. Corporate giving can increase the efficacy of implicit (relational) contracts and reduce the need for formal accounting-based reward systems and controls.