Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game‐Theoretical Perspective: a Comment
识别了Frantz和Walker（1997）博弈模型中导致不披露均衡的关键特征，指出其虽技术正确但未捕捉现实工资谈判的重要方面，同时肯定了分析技术对雇员披露讨论的贡献。
In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non‐disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real‐world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.