Casual and regular contracts: Workers’ self‐selection in the rural labour markets in India
研究了印度农村工人选择临时合同还是固定合同的原因，发现除了工资，时间和信贷约束也很重要，固定合同预支工资对缺乏信贷渠道的工人更有吸引力。
The article examines workers’ choice between casual and regular contracts. It departs from existing theories in that in addition to wage considerations it highlights the significance of time and credit constraints. Results obtained from the ICRISAT villages in India suggest that risk‐averse landless labourers ought to prefer casual to regular contracts because earnings from casual contracts are higher. However, this argument gets strongly modified once we consider that a large part of regular wages are received in advance and that the comparative attractiveness of regular contracts depends crucially on whether labourers have access to credit and other jobs.