MARKET CAPTURE BY TWO COMPETITORS: THE PREEMPTIVE LOCATION PROBLEM*
研究两家竞争企业先后在网络上选址p个设施时，先行动的企业如何通过选址最小化后进入企业能捕获的市场价值，提出了模型和求解方法。
ABSTRACT. We consider a location and allocation game for two competitor firms, A and B, that each seek to locate p facilities in a network. A market is captured by a particular firm if that market's closest facility belongs to that firm rather than a competitor. The question is as follows: Firm A wants to locate its p facilities so that B, which enters also with p facilities after Firm A has located its facilities, will capture the minimum market value possible. That is, Firm A wishes to preempt Firm B in its bid to capture market share to the maximum extent possible. A model is presented that addresses this issue, together with solution methods and computing times.