An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions
研究了道路建设拍卖中进入者与在位者的投标差异，发现进入者出价更激进且中标价更低，其成本分布更分散，且效率更高的企业出价更激进，积压订单更多的企业出价更保守。
This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. We also find that more efficient firms bid, on average, more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively.