SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH FOOTLOOSE FIRMS*
研究双寡头企业在价格-位置博弈中的均衡问题，提出价格先于位置的新博弈顺序，发现同质产品下无纯策略均衡，而引入产品异质性（logit模型）可恢复均衡。
ABSTRACT. We determine the location equilibria in a duopoly model under a novel solution concept. Typically, spatial equilibrium is described as either a simultaneous price and location game, or else as a two‐stage location‐then‐price game. We introduce a new alternative, a two‐stage price‐then‐location game. It is well known that no (pure strategy) equilibrium usually exists under the two standard solution concepts when products are homogeneous. We show this is also true for the new concept. We then provide numerical results for a specific functional form (the logit model) which introduces product heterogeneity into the standard framework, restoring equilibrium when the degree of substitutability between products is not too small.