The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach
通过将模糊彩票建模为两阶段彩票，在预期效用框架下解释为何理性人会偏好已知概率的彩票而非模糊彩票（埃尔斯伯格悖论），并分析风险与模糊性的关系。
The paper describes a decision process under which it is rational to prefer a lottery with known probabilities to a similar ambiguous lottery where the decision maker does not know the exact values of the probabilities (the Ellsberg paradox). This is done by modeling ambiguous lotteries as two-stage lotteries, by assuming the independence axiom without the reduction of compound lotteries axiom, and by using the anticipated utility functional. This paper also gives conditions under which less ambiguity is preferred and presents some comparative statics analysis as well as some inter-personal comparisons. Finally, it proves that within the anticipated utility framework, risk and ambiguity are almost identical. Copyright 1987 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.