A Stochastic Dynamic Nash Game Analysis of Policies for Managing the Strategic Petroleum Reserves of Consuming Nations
构建了一个纳什动态博弈模型，分析石油进口国在石油储备和关税政策上的互动，发现无论国际合作与否，储备的建立和动用策略基本相同。
In this paper we present a Nash dynamic game model of interactions among oil inventory and tariff policies for oil importing countries. The inventory policies consist of the rates for building up and drawing down strategic oil reserves, while the tariff policies consist of setting tariffs as a function of the state of the world oil market. The model represents a stochastic game in which countries are grouped into two players, where each player in the game chooses its individual policies to maximize expected social welfare. We use the model to present empirical results about the sizes of the stockpiles as a function of disruption probabilities, tariff policies and cooperation versus noncooperation between nations. In addition to results regarding the build-up and draw down rates as a function of the amount of disruption or probability of future disruption our central conclusion is that build-up and drawdown policies are essentially the same with or without international cooperation, due to the current inventory limits on U.S. and Foreign Strategic Petroleum Reserves.