Integrating social conflict into economic theory
批评了将社会冲突简化为私人成本收益分析的做法，主张放弃市场模型，从强制权力和包容性利益出发，将社会冲突真正纳入经济理论。
The generalisation of Coasian theorem to the power relationship amounts to depicting conflict as a bargaining process between conflictual parties that are, simultaneously, both partners and adversaries. This perspective leads to different models of 'rational conflicts' i.e. a threat of conflict without any real clash. An alternative approach is developed by different models inspired by the Public Choice School, which build upon the logic of coercive power within the framework of a self-interested behaviour. The integration of 'social conflicts' in a narrowly defined individual cost/benefit theoretical framework has resulted in reducing 'social conflict' to real private (but not social) conflict. In other words, economic theory has considered social protesters either as potential or actual looters but rarely as a group of people struggling for a common cause. Integration of social conflict into economic theory will require: (i) abandoning the ubiquitous market model when describing conflictual relationships; (ii) accepting the logic of force or coercive power as a starting point; and (iii) expanding the idea of interest to include encompassing (including class) interest. Copyright The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.