‘Irresponsible Lending’ with a Better Informed Lender
用一个个人金融模型说明，拥有信息优势的贷款人可能明知对家庭不利仍批准贷款以获取更多消费者剩余，而信息不足的竞争者可能搭便车，导致竞争反而降低福利。
We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage "vis-à-vis" both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in 'irresponsible' lending, approving credit even if this is knowingly against a household's best interest. Unless rival lenders are equally well informed, competition may reduce welfare. This holds, in particular, if less informed rivals can free ride on the incumbent's superior screening ability. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008.