On Deposit Interest Rate Regulation and Deregulation
建立双寡头模型分析银行与非银行金融机构竞争存款，发现存款利率上限起初能增加银行利润，但随存款替代性增强该结论反转，从而解释银行先寻求利率管制后推动放松管制的私人利益动机。
A model is developed in which two financial firms, a "bank" and a " non-bank, " complete duopsonistically for deposit balances. It is shown first that the imposition of a deposit interest rate ceiling on the bank can increase its profit. It is then shown that an increase in the degree of substitutability between the two types of deposits can reverse the conclusion regarding the profitability of an interest-rate ceiling. The analysis is used to support the conclusion that a bank may initially seek the imposition of a deposit interest-rate ceiling and subsequently seek its removal, thus providing a " private interest" explanation of recent bank deregulation. Copyright 1989 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.