Voting with Proportional Veto Power
证明，一个中立的社会选择函数能被合作代理人通过强均衡部分实施的必要条件是各联盟的否决权应最大程度分散；若还满足否决匿名性，则否决权须与联盟规模大致成比例。
We give necessary conditions for a neutral social choice function to be partially implementable by means of a strong equilibrium (i.e., implementable by cooperative agents): the veto power of the various coalitions should be maximally distributed. If moreover the social choice function is veto-anonymous, then the veto power of a coalition must be (roughly) proportional to its size: x per cent of the agents have the power to veto x per cent of the candidates. The procedure of "voting by successive veto" is an example of a neutral and (nearly) veto-anonymous social choice function which is implementable.