Effects of Tort Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving
利用1989-90年行为风险因素调查数据，研究侵权责任、保险、酒价和刑事制裁对重度饮酒及酒后驾车频率的影响，发现强制第三方保险和酒价上涨能减少重度饮酒，但多数威慑政策对已饮酒者驾车行为影响有限。
Using self-reported data on patterns of alcohol use among individuals from the 1989-90 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveys, this study investigates effects of tort liability and third- and first-party insurance, alcohol prices, and criminal sanctions on frequency of binge drinking and driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Requiring drivers to purchase third-party insurance discouraged binge drinking, especially in states combining compulsory insurance with a surcharge for a DUI. Implementation of no-fault laws and switching from contributory to comparative negligence increased binge drinking, while higher alcohol prices reduced it. With one exception, neither tort nor nontort deterrents affected the fraction of bingeing episodes after which the individual drove. Overall, it appears that deterrence of DUI is achieved by curbing behavior that leads to DUI, namely, binge drinking. Once individuals engage in binge drinking, it appears that many policies designed to be deterrents have little influence.