Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs
通过实验室实验，研究自然垄断型成本结构下沉没成本如何削弱可竞争市场的竞争约束，发现沉没成本导致市场表现多样化，但可竞争性仍能有效抑制垄断定价。
This article extends previous laboratory experimental research to examine the competitive discipline of contested markets with a natural monopoly-type cost structure where sunk costs are neither zero nor infinite. Several alternative conjectures as to how or whether sunk costs can weaken the discipline of contested markets are presented and interpreted in the context of the experimental design. Sunk costs are found to weaken the support for strong interpretations of the contestable markets hypothesis and thus yield a wide diversity of dynamic patterns of market performance. Yet the disciplining power of contestability remains impressive, with no indications of sustained monopoly pricing.