Work-Sharing: Some Theory and Recent European Experience
探讨工作分享作为重新分配就业的方式，基于隐性合同理论分析市场失灵，评估三种工作分享形式（职位交换、岗位共享、工时换就业）的效果，并讨论政策含义。
Work-sharing Jacques Dreze With high and protracted unemployment, many in Europe have turned to work-sharing as a way of redistributing employment. This article considers the arguments in favour of work-sharing, evaluates the record so far and assesses the policy implications. The theoretical case for work-sharing must rest on identified market failures. Building on the theory of implicit contracts, it is argued that because new generations are not part of existing labour contracts (how could they be?), there is no market mechanism to redistribute work between those currently under contract and newcomers. Coupled with the observation that both workers and firms value regular as opposed to casual jobs, this view leads to several important conclusions. Downwards wage rigidity and the accompanying unemployment may be efficient; but only because of the existing market failures. Thus there is a justification for public intervention in favour of work-sharing to tackle the market failures directly. Three forms of work-sharing are examined. First, trading jobs requires replacing a worker under contract by a newcomer. Early retirements have been successful in several countries, but only when coupled with mandatory hirings. Second, sharing jobs involves filling one position with more than one worker. Although this has been little used, such a policy has much to recommend it. Finally, trading hours for jobs , reducing weekly working time has been tried but with little success in reducing unemployment. The article concludes with a discussion of how work-sharing relates to other policies to reduce unemployment, including those to promote wage flexibility.