Corporate Governance, Debt, and Investment Policy During the Great Depression
研究1930-1938年大萧条期间，董事会特征如何影响公司投资、债务使用和企业价值，发现复杂公司中董事会规模与企业价值正相关，简单公司中负相关，且简单公司中大规模董事会投资收缩不足、债务更多。
We study a period of severe disequilibrium to investigate whether board characteristics are related to corporate investment, debt usage, and firm value. During the 1930–1938 Depression era, when the corporate sector was shocked by an unprecedented downturn, we document a relation between board characteristics and firm performance that varies in economically sensible ways: Complex firms (that would benefit more from board advice) exhibit a positive relation between board size and firm value, and simple firms exhibit a negative relation between board size and firm value. Moreover, simple firms with large boards do not downsize adequately in response to the severe economic contraction: they invest more (or shrink less) and use more debt during the 1930s. We document similar effects for the number of outside directors on the board. Finally, we also find that companies with properly aligned governance structures are more likely to replace the company president following poor performance. This paper was accepted by Wei Xiong, finance.