The Dynamics of Portfolio Management Contracts
研究客户与投资经理之间的多期关系，探讨如何通过合同设计激励能力未知的经理获取有价值信息，发现最优初始合同会降低绩效报酬，且合同选择仅揭示部分信息，事后业绩对后续合同至关重要。
We consider the multiperiod relationship between a client and a portfolio manager and the resulting problem of motivating a manager of unknown ability to acquire valuable information. We explore the contractual forms and the optimal retention policy of the client and find that the optimal initial set of contracts features a smaller performance-based fee component paid to the manager than in a first-best contract, and the contract choice elicits only partial information about the manager. As a result, ex post performance measurement is critical to future recontracting. In general, managers are retained only if the returns on their portfolio exceed the benchmark by an appropriate amount.