Persistent Court Corruption
构建了一个法院腐败模型，解释不同国家法院腐败程度差异大且随时间持续的现象。模型显示高腐败需要高罚金，高罚金又吸引更多腐败官员，形成多重均衡。提高法院官员工资可消除高腐败均衡。
Corruption among court officials varies widely across countries and exhibits considerable intertemporal persistence. I present a model of court corruption in which there are multiple equilibria, differentiated by corruption levels. In the model, courts provide incentives for individuals to take/abstain from certain actions. High corruption levels undermine incentive provision and necessitate larger penalties. Larger penalties in turn increase the potential bribes that a court official can collect and so attract more dishonest officials to court employment. This feedback effect generates multiple equilibria. Paying court officials wages sufficiently above the market-clearing rate can eliminate the high corruption equilibrium. Copyright (C) The Author(s). Journal compilation (C) Royal Economic Society 2008.