Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor Independence
探讨审计师同时为客户提供管理咨询服务是否损害独立性，引用Metcalf委员会和Cohen委员会的不同观点，分析利益冲突情形。
The question of whether an auditor should also provide management advisory services (MAS) to an audit client has been extensively debated. On the one hand, the Metcalf Committee Staff Study [1976, pp. 50-52] suggested that supplying both services can create a conflict of interests, particularly when a CPA firm recruits a client's executives and is interested in assuring their success, or when it installs a management information system and subsequently audits the reliability and accuracy of its own work. In these situations, a CPA firm acting as both auditor and consultant may be motivated not to report consulting deficiencies observed during the audit, thereby avoiding erosion of its consulting brand name. In general, any situation which increases the probability that an auditor will not truthfully report the results of his audit investigation can be viewed as a threat to independence.1 An opposing view of potential threats to truthful reporting by auditors engaged in MAS was taken by the Cohen Commission [1978, p. 97],