Political Business Cycles with Endogenous Election Timing: Evidence from Japan
实证研究日本政治经济周期，考虑政府对选举时机的控制，发现传统政治经济周期操纵假说（选举时机影响实际GNP增长）无法被拒绝，同时有限支持机会主义假说（强劲增长触发选举）。
This paper empirically investigates the political business cycle hypothesis for Japan, taking into account the potential two-way interaction that originates from the control (within certain limitations) by the government over election timing of Japanese elections. Using a mixed qualitative and continuous variable simultaneous equation estimation procedure, the authors cannot reject the traditional political business cycle manipulation hypothesis (causation running from the timing of elections to real GNP growth). They also find some limited support for the opportunistic hypothesis (strong real GNP growth triggers elections). Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.