PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, PRICING POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM*
研究了双寡头在弹性需求空间市场中供应差异化产品时的价格-位置均衡，发现三种定价策略下均衡均存在且企业聚集在市场中心；内生定价策略选择导致非对称均衡，替代性越强越可能出现一家选离厂定价、另一家选价格歧视；最后分析了福利权衡。
ABSTRACT. This paper studies the price‐location equilibrium of duopolists supplying differentiated goods and competing in a spatial market with elastic demand. We show that a price‐location equilibrium exists under all three pricing policies traditionally considered by the literature: f.o.b. mill, uniform delivered, and spatially discriminatory pricing. We also show that firms always cluster at the market center. The second part of the paper studies the endogenous choice of pricing policy. A surprising feature of the resulting equilibrium is asymmetry. The greater the extent to which the goods are substitutes, the more likely is it that one firm will choose f.o.b. pricing and the other price discrimination. Finally, the welfare consequences of the analysis show some interesting trade‐offs.