法官执行立法财富转移的激励研究

On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers

Journal of Law & Economics · 1989
被引 82
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了美国司法独立背景下,法官执行立法财富转移的激励问题,指出宪法保障使法官免受日常政治影响,但腐败制裁仍存在。

Abstract

The relative independence of judiciary in the American political system is taken for granted by both its critics and its defenders. Most would agree that the courts are effectively insulated from daily politics as a consequence of constitutional provisions that tend to reduce the ability of other government branches to influence their decisions. At the federal level, for example, judges are given life tenure and can only be removed by means of impeachment; at the state level, most judges serve for more limited periods but generally have a high level of security of office because they are very difficult to remove from the bench prior to the expiration of their terms. Both state federal justices face heavy sanctions in cases of detected corruption, and it is therefore not surprising that most observers accept that bribery plays a negligible role in the process of judicial decision making.

司法独立性法官激励财富转移法律执行