Hotelling Duopoly with Uninformed Consumers
分析了完全知情与不同类型不完全知情消费者共存时，霍特林双寡头的价格竞争，发现不知情消费者导致价格上升或下降，且价格离散可能出现。
This paper analyzes price competition in a duopoly a la H. Hotelling in which perfectly and different types of imperfectly informed consumers coexist. If some consumers don't observe prices, the equilibrium price tends to rise above the full information level; moreover, price dispersion can occur in equilibrium. Both results are in accordance with the literature on this issue. However, if consumers observe prices but not varieties, the equilibrium prices tend to fall below the full information level. Finally, in this latter case, not all the consumers are better off when the market moves to full information. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.