Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
提出新方法研究不完整信息且收益不连续的博弈问题，将打破平局的规则视为解的一部分，并证明引入激励相容的廉价沟通可恢复均衡的存在性。
This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking rules that resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the description of the model. A solution is therefore a tie-breaking rule together with strategies satisfying the usual best-response criterion. When information is incomplete, solutions need not exist; that is, there may be no tie-breaking rule that is compatible with the existence of strategy profiles satisfying the usual best-response criteria. It is shown that the introduction of incentive compatible communication (cheap talk) restores existence.