On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
研究理性预期下静态和动态投机的可能性，认为除非交易者有不同的先验信念或能获得保险，否则投机依赖不一致的计划，因此被理性预期排除。同时探讨价格泡沫及其鞅性质，指出泡沫依赖于交易者的短视。
This paper considers the possibility of static and dynamic speculation when traders have rational expectations. Its central theme is that, unless traders have different priors or are able to obtain insurance in the market, speculation relies on inconsistent plans, and thus is ruled out by rational expectations. Its main contribution lies in the integration of the rational expectations equilibrium concept into a model of dynamic asset trading and in the study of the speculation created by potential capital gains. Price bubbles and their martingale properties are examined. It is argued that price bubbles rely on the myopia of traders and that they disappear if traders adopt a truly dynamic maximizing behavior.