双寡头垄断中的创新与模仿

Innovation and Imitation in a Duopoly

Review of Economic Studies · 1985
被引 47
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

在双寡头市场中,一家企业拥有不可专利的创新想法时,创新预期利润与创新成本呈非单调关系;成本高的创新可能被采用,而成本低的反而不会。

Abstract

In a duopoly where one firm has the idea for a non-patentable innovation, the expected profits from the innovation will not be a monotonic function of the cost of innovating. Furthermore, a costly innovation may be undertaken, where an inexpensive one would not have been, all other things being equal.

双寡头创新模仿非专利创新