Bidding Behaviour in Multi‐Unit Auctions – an Experimental Investigation
通过实验室实验，比较五种多单位拍卖机制（统一价格公开拍卖、统一价格密封投标、Ausubel拍卖、Vickrey拍卖和歧视性密封投标）在需求减少、收入等价和效率方面的表现。
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.