The Design of Internal Control and Capital Structure
研究企业何时将控制权分配给股东、债权人或管理层，发现当现金流对管理层努力敏感时股东获得控制权，反之债权人获得否决权，并分析不同控制权下债务水平与企业价值的相关性变化。
We study the design of internal control and capital structure. We pose the question, When is control allocated only to shareholders and when is it allocated to other stakeholders, such as debtholders, or the management team? We show that shareholders (debtholders) get control when the firm's cash flow is relatively sensitive (insensitive) to managerial effort. Our theory implies that the signs of the correlations between endogenous variables when shareholders have absolute control are reversed when debtholders have veto power. In particular, debt level and firm value are negatively (positively) correlated when debtholders have veto power (shareholders have absolute control).