Testing theories of behavior for extensive-form two-player two-stage games
研究了两人扩展式博弈中的选择行为，发现层级n模型能较好解释数据，利他行为主要表现为平等主义和功利主义，未发现显著的互惠行为。
Abstract We examine choices in two-player extensive-form games that give subjects opportunities for individualistic as well as other-regarding behavior, and where each subject makes choices in a variety of games. Following an extensive search over models, where we estimate a single parameter vector for all the games rather than different parameter vectors for each game, we find that (1) the level- n model organizes the data well, (2) other-regarding behaviors in these games appear to consist primarily of egalitarian and utilitarian behaviors, and (3) there is no significant evidence for reciprocal behavior.