The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption
分析政府干预如何为腐败创造空间，并探讨在无法完全杜绝腐败的情况下，如何通过调整官僚规模和工资来实现次优干预，对研究腐败与公共政策的经济学者有参考价值。
Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments will try to prevent it. They may create rents for bureaucrats, induce a misallocation of resources, and increase the size of the bureaucracy. Since preventing all corruption is excessively costly, second-best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes. When corruption is harder to prevent, there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public-sector wages. Also, the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income.