On the Political Economy of Urban Growth: Homeownership versus Affordability
研究了一个代际交叠经济中，居民选择居住地和住房拥有量，同时投票决定新建许可数量，发现住房供给不足的恶性循环导致自有住房与可负担性之间的政策冲突。
We study the equilibrium properties of an overlapping-generation economy where agents choose where to locate and how much housing to own, and city residents vote on the number of new building permits every period. Undersupply of housing persists in equilibrium under conditions we characterize. City residents invest in housing because they expect their investment to be protected by a majority opposed to urban growth. They vote against growth because they have invested in local housing. This vicious cycle between ownership and urban growth generates a tension between the common housing policy objectives of affordability for all and homeownership for most.