Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions
通过估计酒类需求的空间模型，分析政府控制的零售业对进入模式的影响，发现宾夕法尼亚州酒类管制委员会导致商店数量远低于最优水平，消费者剩余受损，但政府运营缓解了自由进入对农村消费者的偏见。
We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry's bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry.