Stackelberg Leadership as a Natural Solution Under Cost Uncertainty
研究在信息共享被禁止且成本不确定时，差异化双寡头企业如何自愿形成斯塔克尔伯格领导-跟随关系，并发现产量竞争下这种自然安排优于纳什均衡且提升总福利。
This paper analyzes a differentiated duopoly model with cost uncertainty in an environment where information sharing is prohibited. The duopolists can commit themselves to be a Stackelberg leader or follower at the time when they know the distribution, but not the actual values, of their own and the rival's costs. In a natural Stackelberg situation, the firms agree on the assignment of roles and neither prefers the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. An natural Stackelberg situation is shown to be possible under quantity (but not price) competition. Total expected welfare is higher in the natural Stackelberg situation than in the Nash equilibrium. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.