The Impact of Vote Differentiation on Investment Performance in Listed Family Firms
研究了上市家族企业中因投票权差异导致的所有权与控制权分离对投资绩效的影响，发现家族控制权与所有权一致时投资绩效更好，分离时则降低。
This article investigates the effects of separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation on listed family firms’ investment performance. The authors study the question of whether family-controlled firms have better investment performance than nonfamily firms and whether this investment performance is negatively affected by a separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation. Marginal q is used as a performance measure. The empirical analysis shows that family control has a positive impact on investment performance when ownership and control are aligned, whereas separation of ownership and control in terms of vote-differentiated shares reduce investment performance.