Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
研究势博弈中均衡的稳健性，证明最大化势函数的纳什均衡在一般情况下是稳健的，即当不完全信息博弈的收益几乎总是由完全信息博弈给出时，存在一个均衡行为接近该纳什均衡。
Potential games are games with potential functions.Technically, the potential function defines a refinement concept.We provide justification for this refinement concept using the notion of robustness of equilibria.A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the Nash equilibrium.We show that Nash equilibria that maximize potential functions are generically robust.