Communication in Federal Politics: Universalism, Policy Uniformity, and the Optimal Allocation of Fiscal Authority
研究了联邦立法机构中代表们策略性交换政策相关信息时，沟通偏差如何导致过度支出、普遍主义和政策统一性等低效结果，并据此发展了财政分权理论，美国市政数据支持其预测。
The paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy-relevant information. Depending on the type of policy under consideration, communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible. This generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending, universalism, and uniformity. Building on these findings, I develop a theory of fiscal (de-)centralization, which revisits the work of Oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication. Empirical results from a cross section of US municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending.