Product diversification, performance criteria and compensation at the corporate manager level
检验Galbraith和Nathanson的发展阶段模型，研究产品多元化程度如何影响企业经理的绩效标准客观性、奖金占比及奖金分配决策方式。
Abstract The paper describes a test of the Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) model of stages of development. In particular, Galbraith and Nathanson hypothesized that in highly diverse firms: (1) performance criteria are more objective, (2) bonus is a larger proportion of total compensation, and (3) bonus allocation decisions are based more on an objective ‘formula’ of performance evaluation than on the discretion of the firm President or Chief Executive Officer. The study compared the three variables across three diversification groups (high, medium, low), based on Rumelt's (1974) classification (single product, vertically integrated, dominant, related, unrelated, and conglomerate). The study used written surveys of corporate managers in Fortune 1000 manufacturing firms.