Do State Enterprises Manage Earnings More than Privately Owned Firms? The Case of China
研究中国国有企业与私营企业在盈余管理上的差异，发现国企盈余管理程度更低，政府保护可能缓解了管理层操纵信息的压力，且随着市场化推进，两者差异缩小。
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of state ownership on earnings management. In contrast with the conventional belief that state ownership is the root of corporate inefficiency, we find lower levels of earnings management among state‐owned enterprises than privately‐owned firms in China even after controlling for the effect of tunneling. Further investigation suggests that the protection of state enterprises by the government might have played an important role in mitigating the pressure on managers to manipulate firm‐specific information. Moreover, we find that the divergence in earnings quality between state‐owned and privately‐owned firms becomes less evident as the economy becomes more and more market driven.