Grading, Minimum Quality Standards, and the Labeling of Genetically Modified Products
用分级和最低质量标准理论分析转基因产品标签，发现过严的非转基因纯度标准会导致非转基因产品消失，而生产者偏好的标准比消费者和社会福利最优标准更严格。
We relate the labeling of genetically modified (GM) products to the theory of grading and minimum quality standards. The model represents three stages in the supply chain, assumes a vertical product differentiation framework, allows for the accidental commingling of non‐GM products, and treats regulation as a purity threshold for non‐GM products. We find that a non‐GM purity level that is too strict leads to the disappearance of the non‐GM product, and that some quality standard benefits farmers. Indeed, the standard that is optimal from the perspective of producers is stricter than what is optimal for consumers and for societal welfare.