Equity Carve‐Outs and Managerial Discretion
提出管理者自由裁量权假说，认为管理者不愿分拆子公司，只有在资本受限时才会进行股权分拆。研究发现分拆前公司业绩差、杠杆高，且用分拆资金偿债的公司平均超额收益为+6.63%，远高于用于投资的公司。
This study proposes a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve‐outs in which managers value control over assets and are reluctant to carve out subsidiaries. Thus, managers undertake carve‐outs only when the firm is capital constrained. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that carve out subsidiaries exhibit poor operating performance and high leverage prior to carve‐outs. Also consistent with this hypothesis, in carve‐outs wherein funds raised are used to pay down debt, the average excess stock return of + 6.63 percent is significantly greater than the average excess stock return of −0.01 percent for carve‐outs wherein funds are retained for investment purposes.