Out‐of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids
通过新颖的实验方法，研究一级价格拍卖中偏离风险中性均衡出价的原因，发现主要源于错误的最佳反应而非错误预期。
Deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to incon-sistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies (e.g. due to risk aversion, regret, quantal-response mistakes). To dis-tinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions. We extensively test the internal validity of this setup. We find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be due to wrong expectations but due to deviations from a risk-neutral best reply.