Relational Contracts in Competitive Labour Markets
研究匿名竞争性劳动力市场中企业通过关系契约激励员工，模型显示高工资企业有更高留任率和生产率，导致工资、生产率和人力资源策略的差异，并产生内生职业阶梯。
We analyze a large, anonymous labour market in which firms motivate their workers via relational contracts. The market is frictionless and features on-the-job search, in that all acceptable vacancies are immediately filled and the employed compete with the unemployed for vacancies. While firms and workers are ex ante identical, the unique equilibrium exhibits a continuous distribution of contracts in which high wage firms have higher retention rates, more motivated workers and higher productivity. The model thus generates dispersion in wages, productivity and human resource strategies, and gives rise to endogenous job ladders. An exogenous increase in on-the-job search increases the quantity of jobs but decreases their quality; with sufficient on-the-job search there is full employment, and wage dispersion rather than unemployment motivates workers.