Optimal deadlines for agreements
研究了谈判中延迟成本如何促使双方透露信息并提高决策质量，发现最优截止期限取决于冲突程度，中等冲突时存在有限的最优截止期限。
Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the end, or a deadlock, in which concessions end permanently. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case, but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between the negotiating parties is intermediate, the optimal deadline is positive and finite, and is characterized by the shortest time that allows efficient information aggregation in equilibrium. © 2012 Ettore Damiano, Li, Hao, and Wing Suen.