Stabilization, Syndication, and Pricing of IPOs
提出IPO后市交易中，承销团通过以发行价回购股票（价格稳定）来事后补偿不知情投资者，这比事前折价发行更有效，但流动性和承销成本限制了稳定操作，导致均衡中仍存在一定折价。
We argue that in the after-market trading of an IPO, the underwriting syndicate, by standing ready to buy back shares at the offer price ("price stabilization"), compensates uninformed investors ex post for the adverse selection cost they face in bidding for IPOs. This domi? nates ex ante compensation by underpricing. The reason is that stabilization exploits ex post information about investor demand whereas underpricing must be based on ex ante infor? mation. However, liquidity and syndication costs constrain the use of stabilization which, in equilibrium, generates some underpricing as well. We develop a model that formalizes this intuition and generates several empirical implicatio