Don't Demotivate, Discriminate
研究管理者在分配任务时，为避免打击被偏爱的员工的积极性而进行歧视的现象，发现无歧视均衡不稳定，管理者更愿承诺不歧视。
This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria exist where the manager discriminates in favor of the employee whom the employees expect to be favored. The manager, who has no taste for discrimination, discriminates in order to avoid demotivating the “favorite.” We show that the nondiscriminatory equilibrium is unstable. Yet the manager would prefer to commit not to discriminate.