Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information
构建了企业家与风险投资家在对称信息下签约、后续可能出现信息不对称的模型，解释了为何早期融资偏好优先股，而债务和普通股用于信息不对称概率较低的后期阶段，并提供了实证调查支持。
A model is developed wherein entrepreneurs and venture capitalists contract under symmetric information. Asymmetric information may arise following first contracting. It is shown this can lead to debt infeasibility and preferred equity usage. Control is linked to choice between common and preferred. Results are robust to multiperiod extensions. Roles of convertible preferred, retained equity, and debt in IPOs are considered. An empirical survey of venture capital firms is presented demonstrating preferred dominates in early financing. Debt and common are used far less – generally at later stages under lower probability of asymmetric information. These results agree with the theory's implications.