Vertical Integration in the Pork Industry
用产权模型解释美国猪肉产业中公司自有农场（一体化）相对于独立合同养殖（契约生产）份额上升的原因，指出契约在特定情况下无法将生产资产控制权充分转移给中间商，而一体化则消除了养殖户的某些激励，导致公司农场生产成本较高。
This article provides an economic explanation regarding why the share of U.S. pork raised on company‐owned farms with hired management (integration) is increasing relative to production through independently owned‐and‐operated contract growers (contracting). The article develops a property rights model that shows how in certain circumstances production contracts do not transfer sufficient control over the use of production assets to intermediaries. On the other hand, integration removes certain grower incentives, with the result that production on company farms tends to be relatively costly. Practical examples of factors that influence the likelihood of full integration are emphasized.