Matching with Contracts
建立了一个包含大学录取、劳动力市场匹配和组合拍卖的合同匹配模型，引入离散异质工人的“总需求法则”，证明在工人可替代时该法则适用于利润最大化企业，并给出工人诚实报价的占优策略条件。
We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new “law of aggregate demand” for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions.