内幕交易与知情投机的危害

The Harm From Insider Trading and Informed Speculation

Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1989
被引 184
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

通过理论模型说明,内幕交易者和其他知情投机者会侵占公司投资收益,损害其他股东,从而抑制公司投资并降低效率。

Abstract

Insider traders and other speculators with private information are able to appropriate some part of the returns to corporate investments made at the expense of other shareholders. As a result, insider trading tends to discourage corporate investment and reduce the efficiency of corporate behavior. In the context of a theoretical model, measures that provide some indication of the sources and extent of the investment reduction are derived.

内幕交易知情投机公司投资效率股东权益